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Introduction
Iraq has been a key contributor to OPEC liquids growth, with IOCs in southern Iraq having added approximately 1.7-1.8 mb/d (million barrels per day) in the period 2010-17 (see Figures 1 and 2 ). Despite this upstream growth, Iraq's midstream and downstream have failed to keep pace -a dynamic that allows Iraq to occupy a peculiar position within the Middle East oil complex: it is the only major producer in the region where onshore pipeline development (including storage and pumping capacity) is undermining future output potential. Similarly, Iraq -unlike its upstream regional peers -is the only major producer heavily reliant on refined product imports, a reflection of an underdeveloped refining system and of a misalignment between the product yield of Iraq's refining output and its domestic demand. As Iraq increases its importance in global oil markets (particularly the medium-heavy sour physical market), the interplay between upstream, midstream, and downstream will have major implications for Iraq's short-medium production outlook. This interplay will take place against the backdrop of:
• Iraq's portfolio of future production becoming heavier as the importance of the Mishrif Reservoir (24-30° API) 1 grows over time;
• Delays to increasing onshore storage and pumping capacity, a dynamic impacting crude quality and export growth;
• The increasing importance of sourcing water for oil injection needs, particularly given complications surrounding mega-projects such as the Common Seawater Supply Project (CSSP);
• Requirements to upgrade existing refineries to meet both refined product demand and to manage the changing quality of crude feedstock as production growth gets heavier; 2 and
• A new period of political transition following Iraq's May elections -a dynamic with implications for the future direction of oil sector investment and fiscal reform.
Section 2 of this paper provides an outline of the history and development of Iraq's oil sector and the political and commercial drivers behind the mismatch between upstream and downstream development; Section 3 assesses Iraq's short-term production outlook by field; Section 4 considers factors constraining Iraq's medium-long-term output potential (including water supply for reservoir management, onshore storage and pumping capacity, and midstream pipeline development). Section 5 contains an assessment of Iraq's refining capacity and future downstream strategy in light of production trends, domestic demand, and the changing sources of feedstock for power generation. Iraq's attempts to rebuild following the Iran-Iraq war were again interrupted by the 1991 Gulf war and later by international sanctions. The damage to oil infrastructure due to Operation Desert Storm was severe: pumping stations (K3, Zb-1), gathering centres, and refineries were severely damaged. Alongside the series of interruptions to exports, the UN oil-for-food programme 7 encouraged corruption within Iraq's State Organization for the Marketing of Oil (SOMO) by encouraging oil sales to traders and brokers who took advantage of Iraq's geopolitical isolation and sanctions. 8 The 1990s also witnessed upstream problems: the cannibalization of equipment, which resulted in inefficient reservoir management, was a particular concern. The destruction of storage facilities and high water-cut rates at southern fields resulted in the emergence of water handling as a key problem, impacting both recovery rates and crude quality (the blending of Basra Light with heavier crudes resulted in Basra Light's gravity falling to 28-29° API, from its standard of 34 °API gravity).
In the early 2000s, Iraq's oil production was 2. 16 The first bid round included Iraq's largest southern fields, specifically, Rumaila, Zubair, and West Qurna. In order to win, IOC representatives had to place two envelopes in a box:
• the first held the figure the oil company proposed to charge for each barrel of incremental production above an agreed baseline (the remuneration fee);
• the second held a figure indicating the IOC's Plateau Production Target (PPT).
The lowest fee and the highest PPT would win. For IOC contractors, the TSCs allowed IOCs to recover costs through service fees. The remuneration fee -a bid made by the IOCs subject to a maximum set by the MoO -was adjusted over time by an 'R-factor': the ratio of aggregate cash receipts to aggregate costs. An R-factor of less than 1 would allow for the full fee; an R-factor of more than 1, however, would adjust the remuneration fee downwards. Alongside the remuneration fee, service costs were payable on a quarterly basis (IOCs could elect to be paid in either cash or crude) and the share of revenues available for cost recovery was fixed -a factor which overlooked the cyclicality of the oil price. Iraq's state companies would also take a 25 per cent share and the Ministry of Finance would implement a 35 per cent tax on the remuneration fee. The first field in the bid round, Rumaila, received two bids: one from a consortium which comprised ExxonMobil and Petronas; and the other, from BP and CNPC. 17 In the end, the first bid round resulted in just Rumaila being awarded (following renegotiations between BP and the MoO). There had been six other contracts where bids were placed, however these bids had remuneration fees higher than the maximum set by the Ministry of Oil. 18 Whilst Rumaila was the only award in the first bid round, the MoO later negotiated terms with consortia for Zubair, West Qurna-1, and the Missan group of fields (see Appendix, Table A1 ). In December 2009, a second round was held with seven contracts being awarded (unlike the first round, these were designed to develop new fields), see Table A2 . The un-awarded gas fields from the first round were tendered in Iraq's third licensing round for gas fields (see Table A3 ). Following the two oil licensing rounds of 2009, Iraq held two further exploration rounds (in 2012 for 12 blocks, Table A4 ) and in 2018 (see Table A5 ).
The TSCs were primed for commercial conflict at the outset: at its most basic level, the first dispute between the IOCs and the MoO took place in determining the baseline production of the fields (in order to assess incremental volumes and the remuneration fee). A second problem with the bidding rounds was that they created a warped incentive structure: IOCs were rewarded for bidding unrealistically high PPTs in order to win 19 (with the subsequent aim of renegotiating them down later -a strategy which, in hindsight, ultimately worked). Third, as previously mentioned, if the R-factor was less than 1, the fee was equivalent to 100 per cent of the remuneration fee. As the R-factor increased (in other words, as cost recovery increased), the remuneration fee was adjusted downward. This created distorted outcomes: IOCs could gold-plate 20 their pipeline of expenditures allowing for an R-factor of less than 1, resulting in a higher remuneration fee. Fourth, as Fadhil Chalabi (a former OPEC Secretary General) 6 has pointed out, the PPTs at the time took no consideration of forecasts of global oil demand and non-OPEC production: both suggested that the call on incremental Iraqi oil growth was small. 21 At a more serious level, the IOCs immediately recognized both the impossibility of reaching their contractual PPTs without water access, and the need for the MoO to invest in midstream infrastructure (including export facilities). The water access challenge prompted the MoO to approach ExxonMobil in 2010 to discuss what later became known as the Common Seawater Supply Project (CSSP), a waterinjection project designed to enhance oil recovery at southern fields.
Political dynamics and mismanagement
The In many respects, the political dysfunction of Maliki's premiership from 2006 to 2014 was a result of Iraq's muhassasa system -the political system of quota-sharing whereby the Iraqi state and its institutions are divided on ethnic and sectarian lines -which became an invitation for Iraq's Shi'ite exiles (often with little experience) to build networks of patronage to consolidate power over ministries. The muhassasa system also encouraged corruption: key positions within strategic ministries (Oil, Defence, Interior) were distributed according to a sectarian logic. 24 21 Fadhil Chalabi, Oil Policies, Oil Myths: Observations of an OPEC insider, p. 264. 22 Thamir Ghadhban does, however, make the point in an email to the author that the crackdown by Maliki on armed militias in the south was welcomed and considered a positive move towards law and order. 23 It is also the case that a number of 'handshake deals' took place between Baghdad and Erbil over federal budget transfers in return for oil export via the KRG. See also: Ahmed Mehdi, Luay Al-Khateeb, 'The Kurds Can't Afford to Leave Iraq', New York Times op-ed, 9 November 2014. 24 As Faleh Al-Jaber, the eminent Iraqi sociologist, has written: 'The party that runs a ministry then makes sure that within this sectarian quota system, the ministry is staffed with cronies, followers and relatives, with almost complete disregard for competence or merit … the distribution of appointments is also a distribution of resources'. Faleh Jaber, 'The Iraqi Protest Movement: From identity politics to issue politics', LSE Middle East Centre Paper Series 25 June 2018, p. 15.
Higher oil prices also encouraged a deepening of the social and ethnic divides inherent within the muhassasa system: Iraq's public sector (including the Kurdish Regional Government, or KRG) grew significantly during the mid-late 2000s. According to the IMF, public sector employment tripled from 2004 to 2013 (from one million to three million jobs 25 ), but despite this, public service provision (health, education, and electricity) remained inadequate. The bloated public sector also depended on fuel and electricity subsidies. Some estimates suggest that between 2011 and 2014, fuel subsidies accounted for around 10-11 per cent of Iraq's GDP. 26 The subsidy system also dented the development of Iraq's gas and power sector, with low end-user prices remaining below the opportunity cost of supply (in 2017, for example, despite having spent just under $13 bn on electricity, Iraq collected just under $1 bn from consumers 27 ). Another factor stunting electricity-sector reform has been the role of political elites with interests in the private diesel generation business, otherwise known as 'electricity mafias'. The mismanagement of Iraq's public finances, together with large budgetary outlays for fuel subsidies, also coincided with a failure to drive any investment in Iraq's downstream sector. By the time of Maliki's second term (2010), Iraq's MoO was seeking to double downstream capacity to 1.5 mb/d. Yet Iraq failed to bring online any significant downstream capacity. One major IOC the author spoke to discussed a range of factors that put investors off Iraq's downstream sector. These included: bureaucracy, a lack of government financial backing, and the sub-optimal locations of refineries. 29 In the gas sector, the issue of gas flaring and the lack of facilities to handle associated gas volumes, as oil production increased, led to multi billion-dollar opportunity costs (see Figure 3 ). was not confined to the oil and energy sector alone. According to figures cited by Jaber, government ministries during the Maliki period had signed contracts to build 6,000 projects (with 5,000 of these either non-existent or not implemented) worth $220 bn. 29 One example of poor planning was the Karbala refinery. Originally awarded in 2011, the project was delayed due to the Front-End Engineering and Design (FEED) having to be redesigned after the fuel source for a power plant (near the refinery) was changed from fuel oil to gas. Other examples of mismanagement included the 2013 deal for the Missan refinery signed with Satarem, a company which courted significant controversy at the time due to its financial difficulties and lack of experience. Seen in this light, it is clear that whilst Iraq's upstream performed strongly during the period 2010-14 (with higher oil prices supporting the cost recovery mechanism), the period 2010-14 (outside the upstream) fared worse: gas flaring, a bloated public sector, the lack of midstream and downstream investment -all these factors circled Iraq's political class following the oil price crash of 2014. The fall in oil prices exposed both Iraq's budgetary outlays (such as expenditure on refined fuel imports and gas shortages) and the level of corruption in previous years. The discovery in 2014 by Maliki's successor, Hayder Al-Abadi, of 'ghost soldiers' 30 (in other words, those receiving salaries but absent from work) in the security and interior ministries was a latent microcosm of these 'wasted years'. The IOCs were also casualties of mismanagement and corruption in the over-bloated public sector, where significant bureaucratic delays in basic tasks such as visa-processing for IOCs, led to delays.
The perfect storm: oil prices and ISIS
Even before the oil price collapse of 2014 (see Figure 4) , the legacy flaws of Iraq's TSCs were beginning to emerge -unrealistic PPTs coincided with delays in government bureaucracy, inadequate infrastructure, and water injection issues. The fall in oil prices had a series of negative impacts on Iraq, not least that the country's foreign currency reserves fell from $77. This inter-Shi'ite political competition was also taking place against the backdrop of Sunni disenchantment and political alienation; by the time of the oil price decline, protests were sweeping across Sunni parts of the country -a dynamic which fed the gradual emergence of ISIS. It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss in detail the origins of ISIS and its devastating impact on Iraq's social and economic fabric (internal displacement, cultural and physical sabotage, and violence); however, several important oil sector dynamics did take place as a result of their emergence (and eventual defeat):
• Severe damage was sustained to the federal Iraq-Turkey pipeline, resulting in an agreement between Baghdad and Erbil to use the KRG-Turkey pipeline (with a capacity of 700,000 b/d) for the evacuation of northern production (particularly Kirkuk);
• The defeat of Iraqi army forces in Mosul, and the Peshmerga's advance into Kirkuk, led to a change of control from NOC-operated fields to those run by smaller Kurdish companies (particularly the KAR Group);
• The attack against the Baiji refinery -Iraq's largest refinery with a nameplate capacity of 310,000 b/d -severely affected Iraq's refining capacity. Baiji's significance lay not only in it being Iraq's largest refinery (producing around a third of the country's gasoline and diesel) but also in its importance to the local economy of Salah Al Din province. The refinery was the largest employer in the province, with a payroll of approximately 4,000-5,000 employees. 35 The war against ISIS also led Iraq to expand its war economy: oil sector investments were cut and government spending on defence and the military increased Historically, most of the oil produced from Rumaila has come from the Main Pay (Zubair formation) which has high permeability and an average API of 34°. Future volumes, however, will focus on the northern section of the field, tapping into the Mishrif reservoir, which is defined by much lower permeability. Both weak aquifer support and the increasing water volumes required for pressure will present a challenge to the northern section in the future. Other problems include handling both produced and injected volumes, together with the need for water separation technologies to handle increasing associated water production with oil. As a result, there is a possibility that BP and its partners will seek a further reduction to its PPT from 2.1 mb/d to 1.7-1.8 mb/d. 13 of landmines (a legacy of the Iran-Iraq war). With production in 2010 at 50,000 b/d, Shell and its JV partners managed to increase production in 2014 to 211,000 b/d, a production increase supported by oilfield services from Petrofac and Wood Group. Despite a number of attempts to renegotiate its PPT with Iraq's MoO, Shell decided to exit Majnoon in 2017 -this was due both to the poor terms of the TSC and to the IOC's wider transformation into the gas business (following the acquisition of BG Group). Following Shell's exit, Iraq is set to take over the field and has contracted a number of oilfield service companies to support production. 38 A deal in early 2017 with Halliburton to drill 30 wells will also support production at the field, particularly since it is unlikely that Majnoon will need reservoir support for water needs until production increases above 700,000-800,000 b/d. Other smaller fields that can support production include: Luhais, Tuba, Nahr Bin Umar (currently producing 35,000 b/d), and Ratawi. These fields were initially earmarked for ExxonMobil and PetroChina (as part of an upstream equity deal for development of the Common Seawater Supply Project, otherwise known as the South Integrated Project). However, the sclerotic progress on CSSP has meant that the state-run companies will operate them. Luhais and Tuba have supported production growth in 2018: Luhais production was around 34,000 b/d in mid-May, increasing to 90,000 b/d in July; similarly, production at Tuba (which averaged 31,000 b/d in 2017) rose to 39,000 b/d in July 2018. Given the size of the resource base of these fields, production can be increased significantly. Iraq also launched a fifth bid round in 2018 for blocks in Basra, Maysan, Wasit, Karbala, and Baghdad.
Oil production dynamics
Despite state-run companies having improved their production performance this year, expectations have been tempered at other fields. For example, Subba -a field operated by Dhi Qar -came online toward the end of 2017. This field started production at around 29,000 b/d in 2017 and is now producing at just half this level (15,000 b/d). There is a possibility that Chevron will work with Dhi Qar in the development of this field, following an MoU signed with Dhi Qar in 2018. 39 The largest production wildcard this year is Kirkuk (see Figure 8) . As previously mentioned, a number of Kirkuk fields were under KRG control from 2014 to 2017 (Avana/Bai Hassan and Khurmala Dome). Kirkuk production represented just under 300,000 b/d of the KRG's production profile. 
Source: MEES, Author analysis
Since the federal recapture of Kirkuk fields, production has been stymied by the lack of agreement between Baghdad and Erbil over use of the KRG's export pipeline. This has led NOC (who took over operator status of the fields from KAR group) to reinject production volumes, a situation causing damage to the reservoir. Whilst Baghdad has discussed a swap deal with Iran this has not progressed, due to security and logistical issues. 40 Some short-term measures have taken place to help offset the problem: in July 2018, a 40,000 b/d pipeline was made operational, connecting the field to the Daura refinery in Baghdad, enabling production to increase slightly. Similarly, the re-start of one of Baiji's refinery units in September 2018 will help increase flows to around 10,000 b/d initially, rising up to 70,000 b/d by year-end.
The appointment in October 2018 of a new prime minister, Adel Abdul-Mahdi (a figure with close links to Kurdistan's ruling parties and a key figure behind the 2014 oil export deal between Baghdad and Erbil), could help unlock the current impasse. A future deal with the KRG would also help give confidence to BP, who signed an MoU with Iraq's MoO to increase Kirkuk's output to 700,000 b/d (from its current production capacity of 440,000 b/d). 41 Alongside BP, Rosneft -the Russian energy champion -has also indicated interest in developing Kirkuk, particularly given its 60 per cent equity stake in the KRG-Turkey pipeline and its interest in developing a gas plan for northern Iraq. 42 Other fields recaptured by Baghdad following the defeat of ISIS include fields in Salah Al Din province (Ajeel, Hamrin, Qayarrah). However, despite the re-entry of Sonangol at Qayarrah and Najma (which has medium quality oil), these fields' crude is very heavy (15-18° API) and production will depend on the rehabilitation of refineries, treatment facilities, and ongoing insecurity concerns. 40 In 
Factors constraining long-term output potential
Based on the above, it is expected that Iraq's production capacity can reach a level of just above 5 mb/d by early 2019. This will come from incremental gains at Halfaya, state-operated fields in the south, and the gradual increase in output from NOC-operated Kirkuk (see Figure 9 ). Iraq's target of 6.5 mb/d by 2022 will, however, prove more challenging due to multiple factors including water injection requirements, midstream capacity constraints (as production growth gets heavier), and export capacity issues. 
Water supply
As IOCs sought to ramp up production, the main techniques used to achieve large-scale increases in production (whilst maintaining reservoir pressure) have been via gas or water injection. However, given that much of Iraq's gas was (and continues to be) flared rather than re-injected (despite growing processing volumes from Basra Gas Company), and given that sales gas volumes are earmarked for power and electricity generation, this has left water as the preferred option for maintaining reservoir pressure and improving oil recovery. Also, based on flooding experiments and reservoir studies, it has been proven that water injection is a far superior method to gas injection, from a recovery point of view, for Iraq's southern fields (except for the light Yamama oil in Bin Umar and Ratawi fields 43 ).
A key challenge to future production growth therefore remains the availability of water for reservoir pressure support. As previously mentioned, part of the reason for IOCs renegotiating their PPTs in the 43 I would like to thank Thamir Ghadhban for this point. Given the difficulties of sourcing water from the Euphrates and the Tigris -due to the demand from local agriculture and a lack of volume (only 10 per cent of the quantities required can be provided) -seawater has been identified as the only source of water available in sufficient quantity for oil-injection needs. Furthermore, the upstream river policies of Iran and Turkey (heavy dam construction is in progress 45 ) are set to make matters worse for Iraq.
In 2010, just as BP started water treatment for Rumaila, the ExxonMobil-operated West Qurna was suffering water-injection shortages. The impact of increased water injection from Qarmat Ali at Rumaila can be seen in Figure 10 , which shows the impact of increased water injection in Mishrif reservoir from 2013 onward. Future Rumaila growth will come from Mishrif, but this oil is medium-heavy and will require further water injection rates beyond 1 mb/d to sustain production, particularly given the heavy decline rate at the field. In this light, the first phase of the CSSP (initially 5 mb/d, but capable of being increased to 7.5 mb/d at a later date) will support water injection rates at the following fields: Rumaila, Zubair, West Qurna-1, West Qurna-2, Tuba, Majnoon, and Halfaya. Full utilization of the SPMs has, however, been undermined by onshore infrastructure and pumping capacity at Al-Fao. Alongside the problem of supplying SPMs, a future risk concerns the two 48-inch subsea pipelines running from Al-Fao to BOT. Given the lack of regular maintenance and routine inspections (the last one having been conducted in the early 1990s), BOC has not utilized BOT at full pressure, instead operating the pipelines at low pressure (due to significant corrosion in the pipe). 52 With KAOT having remained offline for almost two years (due to delayed rehabilitation work, infrastructure leaks, and ongoing disputes with contractors), export capacity additions will depend heavily on increasing pumping capacity to underutilized SPMs.
Onshore storage
In terms of onshore storage, southern Iraq's major crude storage depots include: Zubair (Z-1), Zubair-2 (Z-2), Tuba, PS-1, and Fao. Iraq's total southern storage design capacity is currently around 18 million barrels and operating capacity at around 11 million barrels). Oil production in the southern fields (Rumaila, Zubair, West Qurna, Majnoon, Gharraf, Ahdab, Buzurgan, and Subba) is delivered to the Z-1, Z-2, PS-1, and Tuba depots, and then to the Fao export depot. From 2009, following Iraq's bidding rounds, southern onshore storage capacity hovered at around 11 million barrels. The increase of oil production from 2009 onward -following the bid rounds -added increasing pressure to storage tank capacity. The problem became particularly acute from the end of 2013 as production from West Qurna-2 (API of 22.8°) and Halfaya (22.5°) began to increase; the gradual ramp-up in heavier production was not met by sufficient capacity to enable crude segregation, leading to a deterioration in the quality of Iraq's flagship Basra Light grade. The lack of segregated tanks to account for crude quality, together with the lack of professional blending, led to volatility in the API of Basra Light (in April 2014, the API fluctuated between 28.07° and 32.37°), a dynamic that was not helped by the practice of dumping fuel oil with the export streams. The deterioration of Basra Light from 2012 to 2014 also impacted Iraq's revenues, as the fall in quality meant that SOMO had to pay a compensation rate of $0.4/bbl for each degree of API below specified volumes contracted by offtakers -a situation which led to a greater discount mechanism for Basra Light compared to other regional sour grades.
The situation did, however, begin to improve from 2014 onward, with the increase of storage capacity at Fao where three storage tanks (58,000 m³ each) were added, with connections to SPMs at southern loading facilities. This allowed SOMO to launch a new Basra Heavy crude grade (with two SPMs dedicated to its loadings). Despite having faced initial resistance from Asian refiners (due to poor OSPs and large parcels) the grade -made up of volumes from West Qurna-2, Halfaya, and Gharraf -has gained favour in sour markets and amongst IOCs who increased their allocation of the grade as payback oil. Source: Author analysis, SCOP Despite the success of launching Basra Heavy, a problem facing SOMO in the future is the changing pattern of production. Most of Iraq's production has come from the Zubair formation; however, from 2020, Iraq's production profile is set to get heavier as more oil comes from the Mishrif reservoir (24-28° API, 4 per cent sulphur). This will require even more infrastructure spending on crude segregation. To accommodate this change in crude quality, SOMO has touted the idea of launching a new grade, Basra Medium, to help stabilize Basra Heavy and Basra Light. The new grade would effectively replace the current specifications of Basra Light (with an API of 29-30°, 2 per cent sulphur), while Basra Heavy would remain the same (24°, 4 per cent sulphur) and Basra Light would be lighter at 34° API, sourced from lighter Yamama reservoir fields (such as Luhais and Tuba). 53 Whilst this move should be welcomed, particularly given Asian refining runs and SOMO's successful track record of marketing in Asia (including the development of new JVs with Chinese partners), the launch of the new grade is not 20 expected until at least 2020 (the timetable of the launch being heavily dependent upon the build out of existing storage and facilities for crude segregation and export infrastructure, see Table 4 ). 
Midstream pipeline network
The majority of Iraq's network of pipelines were built in the 1970s. The most important post-2003 developments are the expansion of pipeline networks from Zubair to Fao (built in 2012) and the Halfaya-Fao network which can handle up to 1 mb/d of heavy production from the Missan cluster of fields (primarily Halfaya volumes). Inaugurated in 2014, the Halfaya-Fao pipeline allowed Iraq to segregate its light and heavy crude grades following tank upgrades at Fao and improved pumping station capacity to SPMs. Source: Author analysis, SCOP Whilst Iraq more than doubled its southern export capacity from 2010 to 2017 (from 1.8 mb/d to 4.2 mb/d) -a feat achieved through the commissioning of three SPMs -pumping station capacity at Fao, Zubair-1, and Tuba requires upgrades. In particular:
• although the Halfaya-Fao pipeline can accommodate increased volumes from Missan province over the next year, pumping stations will be at full capacity to move Basra Heavy volumes (set to reach close to 1 mb/d by year-end) from Fao to underutilized SPMs;
• production increases from West-Qurna-2 will be dependent on a newly proposed TubaFao pipeline (which Lukoil will build 54 ), designed to feed volumes from West Qurna-2, Ahdab, and Tuba to Fao;
• until further storage tank farms are built at Fao, oil will continue to be pumped from Zubair-1, Zubair-2, Tuba, and PS-1 -all of which are more than 100 km from offshore loading points -a situation which increases the risk of onshore bottlenecks.
Whilst Iraq has touted the idea of diversifying its export outlets, these attempts rely on state-backed financing and political stability in the region. Despite talk of reconnecting Iraq to the Saudi system, this is unlikely, particularly since Saudi Aramco has already recommissioned the IPSA (Iraqi Pipeline in Saudi Arabia) pipeline for its own use. Similarly, exports through Syria are highly unlikely given the current security situation. Whilst there has been discussion around rebuilding the Kirkuk-Baiji-Ceyhan pipeline (with a number of contractors having presented both technical and commercial offers to the State Company for Oil Projects, or SCOP), no firm timetable has been put in place and the resumption of terror attacks in Kirkuk will likely delay this. Another much-discussed idea is the construction of a 2.25 mb/d pipeline to Jordan for export to Aqaba port. However, this remains delayed and the pipe would have to go through western Iraq, which still has a fragile security situation. 
The refining complex
Iraqi refining runs reached their highest levels in early 2014 (before the onslaught of ISIS) with runs of around 600,000 b/d (see Figure 13 ). 
Limited expansion in refining capacity
Plans to double downstream capacity in 2010 to 1.5 mb/d have been unmet. In fact, the lion's share of Iraq's refining complex was built pre-2003: the country's first hydro-skimming refinery was Daura (1955), while both the Basra refinery and Baiji complex were built in the 1970s and 1980s. As previously mentioned, attempts to solicit foreign investment have floundered: investors have been wary of a subsidized fuel market as well as the prospect of having little control over FEED plans.
Iraq's refining complex has a number of characteristics: first, all Iraq's refineries are simple hydroskimming refineries with high fuel oil surpluses; second, they lack upgrading facilities. The failure of Iraq's downstream to play 'catch-up' with its upstream has highlighted a number of stresses in the country's oil sector:
• Higher domestic crude production has led to higher volumes of associated gas production. As sales gas volumes increase (due to gas capture technologies), liquids (particularly HSFO) have been slowly displaced as a source of power, thereby warranting the need for higher refining complexity.
• As incremental production gets heavier, desulphurization units are required.
• As previously discussed, Iraq's midstream challenges pose a problem for crude segregation and storage.
To avoid lowering the quality of Basra Light (via blending), Iraq will need to upgrade refineries to process heavier grades. The inland upgrading of refineries will take place against the backdrop of Iraq's future portfolio of production growth becoming heavier. An example of this problem can be seen at the Daura refinery: this is designed to operate on crudes with API of 33-35° (primarily Kirkuk) but over time, it will Looking at Iraq's wider refinery expansion plans in detail (see Figure 17) , the refining upgrade nearest completion is set to be at Basra. The two projects with the most advanced FEED are Karbala and Missan, although each has its own set of challenges. Whilst Iraq has bullish estimates (1.4-5 mb/d capacity by 2021 57 ) for its refining expansion strategy, the lacklustre enthusiasm shown at the Kuwait conference -a donor conference launched by Iraq in early 2018 58 -is likely to temper expectations. A more realistic projection is that Iraq (excluding KRG) will reach refining capacity of approximately 800,000 b/d by 2019 (driven by the expansion at Basra and the re-start of Salahuddin-unit 2 at Baiji); assuming a run rate of 80 per cent (given water and power challenges), this leaves throughputs at around 650,000 b/d. 
Domestic Iraqi oil demand
Iraq's delays in the upgrading and expanding of its refining complexity will be further complicated by domestic demand dynamics, as well as by the future role of fuel oil pricing and developments in the gas and power sector.
Looking at domestic demand drivers, from 2009 to 2013 Iraq's oil demand was rising up to 550,000-600,000 b/d, with the largest gains posted in 2012-3, driven by rising gasoline and diesel demand. As previously shown, whilst Iraq's refining capacity of around 650,000 b/d can meet domestic demand, the mismatch between product demand and output (see Figure 18 ) has led to a fuel oil surplus and shortages of diesel and gasoline; this means that Iraq imports products worth approximately $2.5 bn per year. These imports are light products, with an average of 55,000 b/d of gasoline imported in 2017, 35,000 b/d of diesel, and 5,000 b/d of jet fuel and kerosene (see Figure 19 ). 
Iraq's fuel oil problem
The lack of investment in cracking capacity at Iraq's refineries has meant that processing Iraqi crudes has led to high fuel oil yields on distillation (with 50 per cent of every barrel processed coming out as fuel oil, see Figures 20 and 21) . Moving forward, Iraq's fuel oil problem could be resolved in two ways: increased exports or by the use of fuel oil in power generation. Let us examine each option in turn. First, the economics of fuel oil exports will be impacted by IMO 2020, which will both create significant discounts for HSFO prices and widen HSFO-LSFO differentials. Whilst trading opportunities will exist beyond 2020 for HSFO, it is likely that a more economic option for Iraq would be to increase fuel oil use for power generation to reduce crude burn rates; if crude burn were to be eliminated altogether, Iraq could gain approximately $2 bn/year. In fact, Iraq's crude burn rates in 2017 and 2018 (see Figure 25 ) suggest that this is already being done slowly (an unusual drop to zero was registered in September and December 2017). The misalignment of Iraq's product yields with its domestic demand, spurred by both delays to refinery upgrades and the heavier portfolio of crude production, will increase the gap between fuel oil supply and demand. Whilst the domestic power segment could take up more volumes of fuel oil over time, two factors will impede this: first, Iraq's power sector is being geared to gas-fired power generation (see Figure 26) ; second, poor fuel oil infrastructure between refining hubs and power demand centres will make this difficult to achieve. 
Concluding thoughts
This paper has aimed to provide a comprehensive overview of the dynamics in Iraq's upstream, midstream, and downstream, together with the impact on short-to medium-term production prospects. We find that:
• In the short term, Iraq (excluding KRG) has strong potential to reach just above 5 mb/d production capacity by early 2019. Incremental gains this year will be driven by production from Halfaya, particularly given the spare capacity in the Halfaya-Fao pipeline, while further gains are set to come from state-operated fields and Kirkuk output. Additional volumes here can be unlocked due to the re-start of refining operations at Baiji, extra volumes being fed to Daura refinery. Flows could also be increased to the underutilized KRG refineries, and a new deal negotiated with the KRG to market Kirkuk crude via the KRG's pipeline -a more realistic possibility now given the strong ties between Iraq's new prime minister (Adel AbdulMahdi) and the KRG's ruling parties. Despite stretched export capacity, due to the repairs required at the Fao and Zb-1 pumping stations, current onshore storage and pumping capacity can handle an increase of around 150,000-200,000 b/d of heavy exports via underutilized SPMs.
• However, in the longer term, Iraq's production target of 6.5 mb/d will prove more challenging due to delays on water injection (particularly given natural decline rates). Whilst Basra Oil Company is in the process of selecting contractors for a reconfigured version of the CSSP (with a first phase targeting 5 mb/d of seawater injection), this is unlikely to take place until at least 2023. The rise in oil prices throughout 2018 has supported Iraq's fiscal outlook, with a cumulative budget surplus of approximately $24 bn expected this year (assuming an average Iraqi oil price of $65/bbl). Whilst this positive surplus can support infrastructure projects such as water injection, onshore storage, and pumping capacity requirements (particularly at Fao), both weak institutional capacity and the need for co-ordinated planning present downside risks. The need for both midstream and downstream investment is also taking place against the backdrop of an ongoing political transition. The selection of AbdulMahdi (a political independent with reformist ambitions) as prime minister represents a break from Iraq's muhassasa system -particularly given Al-Sadr's decision not to nominate figures from his party to any ministerial portfolio. It has yet to be seen if Abdul-Mahdi will have the independence to push through a reform of Iraq's fiscal policy -particularly in relation to its high public sector spending, subsidies, and the diversion of funds toward salaries.
• Looking at Iraq's refining outlook, it is expected that the country is unlikely to reach its planned 1.4-5 mb/d refining capacity by 2021. Both the lack of enthusiasm shown by foreign investors for Iraq's refining projects (due to poor internal rates of return) and delays to refining projects (Karbala and Missan) imply that a more realistic projection would see Iraq reaching a refining capacity of approximately 800,000 b/d by 2019 (driven by the addition of a fourth crude oil distillation unit at Basra refinery and the re-start of Salahuddinunit 2 at Baiji).
• As product demand increases over the short-medium term, driven by the reconstruction and liberation of areas previously controlled by ISIS, Baghdad's new political leadership will be left with a higher import bill (driven by higher middle-distillate demand). It is expected that delays in upgrading Iraq's refineries (along with heavier crude production) will leave Iraq with a high-sulphur fuel oil problem; it will be increasingly difficult to find a home for these surpluses in power generation (due both to increased use of gas-to-power generation and to the lack of adequate infrastructure capable of moving fuel oil from refining hubs to demand centres). Similarly, the downward trend in high-sulphur fuel oil prices (due to changes in marine fuel demand) will further reduce incentives for export. There will probably be a timing mismatch between delays to Iraq's refining upgrades and the gradual displacement of fuel oil from the power sector (as gas flaring reduces over time). The limited infrastructure build for midstream fuel pipelines could lead to a replay of Iraq's fuel oil problem of 2012-14: further re-injection into fields and blending with lighter grades, a situation that could destabilize crude quality. 
